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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to determine which of two terrorist groups, an ideologically 
based group (Red Brigades) and an ethnically based group (ETA or Basque Fatherland 
and Liberty), is more effective at mobilization. Mobilizing human resources is the 
method by which terrorist groups sustain their levels of membership. Without sustained 
or growing levels of membership, the group declines and soon ceases to exist. By 
determining a group's effectiveness at mobilization, judgments can be made on the 
likelihood of the group experiencing continued mobilization leading to continued 
operations or experiencing demobilization leading to decline. 
The ETA is still a functioning terrorist group whereas the Red Brigades has 
ceased to exist. A possible explanation is the ETA was more effective than the Red 
Brigades at mobilizing resources. After explaining the theory of mobilization, this thesis 
will apply the theory to the two groups. A subsequent comparison of the two groups' 
effectiveness at mobilizing resources will enable a judgment to be made on which group 
is more effective at mobilization. By demonstrating that the ETA was more effective 
than the Red Brigades at mobilizing people, this thesis will give an explanation for the 
survival of the ETA and the decline of the Red Brigades. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis attempts to determine which of two terrorist groups, an ideologically 
based group (Red Brigades) and an ethnically based group (ETA or Basque Fatherland 
and Liberty), is more effective at mobilization. Mobilizing human resources is the 
method by which terrorist groups sustain their levels of membership. Without sustained 
or growing levels of membership, the group declines and . soon c.eases to exist. By 
determining a group's effectiveness at mobilization, judgments can be made on the 
likelihood of the group experiencing continued mobilization leading to continued 
operations or experiencing demobilization leading to decline. 
The ETA is still a functioning terrorist group whereas the Red Brigades has 
ceased to exist. A possible explanation is the ETA was more effective than the Red 
Brigades at mobilizing resources. After explaining the theory of mobilization, this thesis 
will apply the theory to the two groups. A subsequent comparison of the two groups' 
effectiveness at mobilizing resources will enable a judgment to be made on which group 
is more effective at mobilization. By demonstrating that the ETA was more effective 
than the Red Brigades at mobilizing people, this thesis will give an explanation for the 
survival ofthe ETA and the qecline ofthe Red Brigades. 
The definition of mobilization is the control of human resources by a group, in 
other words, the willing sacrifice by individuals to give their time and energies to the 
promotion of the group and its interests. Effective mobilization by a terrorist group 
requires a strong enough appeal to overcome the individual's hesitancy about joining a 
group that engages in illegal activities and whose members are often wanted by the 
ix 
authorities. Effective mobilization also requires the terrorist group to appeal to as large a 
group as possible. If a terrorist group's message reaches a large group of people, the 
potential for mobilizing some of those individuals goes up. 
This thesis will evaluate the effectiveness of the two terrorist groups in mobilizing 
people in three ways. The first way will be to examine. how completely membership in 
the group absorbs an individual's life. Membership that is completely inclusive of an 
individual's everyday life requires a great deal of commitment. In order to convince the 
individual to make the total commitment to the group, the group must be able to 
effectively mobilize that individual. Analyzing whether a group's ideology IS 
independent from its identity is the second way effectiveness will be determined. A 
group with a collective identity that is fixed but an ideology that is independent and 
flexible has a greater ability to appeal to a wider group of people than a group whose 
identity is fixed and ideology is linked to the identity. A group with an independent 
ideology can change or modify its ideology to appeal to more people without the fear of 
alienating the original group of people who are members based on a collective identity 
with the group. A group with a dependent ideology cannot change ideology without 
potentially alienating some members of this core group of support. The final way in 
which mobilization will be judged is the group's ability to successfully frame and 
symbolize its interests and grievances in such a way that appeals to a maximum number 
of people. By framing successfully, the group is able to package its grievances and 
interests in such a way that will motivate people to put the interests of the group ahead of 
X 
their own personal interests. The use of symbols and rhetoric mcrease a group's 
effectiveness at doing this. 
These three criteria will be applied to both groups to determine how effective 
each is at mobilizing resources. The comparison of both groups' effectiveness will give 
an explanation for the survival of the ETA and the demise of the Red Brigades. This 
comparison will give insight into how to more effectively combat terrorist groups. By 
knowing how resources are mobilized, attempts can be made to counter the mobilization 
effort of the terrorist group and subsequently, to send the group into a period of 
demobilization and decline. 
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I. CLASS BASED VERSUS ETHNICALLY BASED TERRORISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will analyze and compare two terrorist groups, one ideologically based 
(the Red Brigades) and the other ethnically based (ETA or Basque Fatherland and 
Liberty), in order to determine if one of the two is more effective at mobilizing ~esources. 
These two groups were selected for this comparison not only because of the presence of 
multiple groups of both types in Europe, but also because of the number of similarities 
between the two groups. These similarities include methods of operating, targets chosen 
and the severity of government efforts to combat them. The similarities between the two 
groups allows for more variables to be removed from the comparison and a more accurate 
and focused comparison to be made of the two groups' effectiveness at using either 
ideology or ethnicity for mobilization. 
The importance of comparing the ability of these groups to mobilize resources 
stems from the need to further understand terrorist groups and their behavior. Although 
terrorists rarely kill or injure large numbers of people, they pose a serious threat because 
of the means they use to attack, against which there are few ways to defend, and the 
often-unpredictable patterns of violence they spin, which puts nearly everyone in the 
affected country in harm's way. The threat posed by another country's military can be 
countered based on predictability and knowledge of how that military can be expected to 
act. The threat posed by a terrorist group is difficult to counter because it's hard to 
predict much about the group. When and where an attack will take place are obvious 
1 
unpredictable variables, but other factors that are just as important and unpredictable are 
a group's location, source of weapons or money and if a group has ceased to exist versus 
become dormant since its last known operation. By comparing ideological and ethno-
nationalist groups and making some determinations about them based on this comparison, 
it might be possible to make more accurate predictions in the future about the expected 
lifespan or level of activity of a terrorist group. This comparison might not enable a 
prediction to be made as to where the next attack by a particular group would occur or 
where it gets its weapons from, but knowing what the motivation of a group is, be it 
ethno-nationalist or ideological, coupled with other information such as historical data 
relating to the group or the political climate where it operates, might make possible 
predictions about the group's expected lifespan. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Although terrorism as it is currently thought of is relatively new, dating back 
roughly fifty years, it is actually an old problem. There is evidence of actions which 
would be considered terrorist today being carried out two thousand years ago. There are 
also names of terrorist groups from hundreds of years ago that are commonplace words in 
today' s vocabulary. Words such as zealot, thug and assassin come from groups that 
originated in the first, seventh and eleventh century, respectively.! Throughout the last 
two thousand years, terrorism has changed constantly, being used as both a religious and 
political tool, being used extensively during certain periods of time and very little during 
1 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 89. 
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others. How it has been defined over the centuries has also changed. Terrorism has been 
defined at times as the fear inducing actions of groups trying to influence a people or a 
government and at other times as the fear inducing way of ruling that a particular 
government chose to employ.2 
Although a long-established problem, it is only in the fifty years after World War 
Two that terrorism has emerged as a significant matter of international importance. 
Developments in media communications, advances in weapons technology and changes 
in the way people travel have changed terrorism in several ways. New technologies in 
media and communications have allowed terrorists to get their much desired publicity 
more quickly, allowing the news of terrorist incidents to reach around the globe almost 
instantaneously. With these improvements in mass communication and the media, 
kidnapping and the use of hostages has become a powerful tool for the terrorist. 
Advancements in explosives and triggering devices have enabled terrorists to carry out 
more innovative and bolder attacks with greater destructive power than ever before. A 
continuous increase in the volume of air travel made hijacking popular with terrorists 
until effective countermeasures made hijacking occurrences less frequent. The methods 
currently available for carrying out a terrorist attack are extremely difficult to detect and 
potentially more destructive, necessitating high levels of urgency in anti-terror efforts. 
A wide range of motivations inspire terrorist groups and their members; examples 
of the different types of motivations include: nationalist, revolutionary (left-wing 
ideology,) far-right extremism, religious extremism and single-issue motivation. Two of 
2 Ibid., 23. 
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the dominant types of European groups in the post World War Two era are the 
ideological group and the ethno-nationalist group. An ideological group centers its 
existence on a political theme, such as the spread of the Marxist-Leninist revolution 
throughout the world. Such groups emerged in the post war era due to the growing 
tensions between major ideologies in the international arena. An ethno-nationalist group 
centers its existence on the shared ethnicity of its members, drawing upon this 
nationalism as motivation. These groups emerged in the post war era in attempts to help 
their respective ethnic groups win homelands and become their own nations. The post 
war decline of imperialism was a significant motivator for the attempts of these ethno-
nationalist groups to form their own nations; the primary attempts at this were made 
through diplomacy and politics, but if these failed, then terrorism was resorted to. It is 
worth noting that terrorist groups seldom fall into one of these two groups exclusively; 
more often, a terrorist group will be a combination of characteristics with one particular 
dominant characteristic. For example, while both the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and 
the Basque separatist group, the ETA, are generally considered ethno-nationalist groups, 
they have both at some time advocated left-wing revolutionary ideologies. Another 
example is religious extremist groups, such as those in the Middle East, that often have 
deep ethno-nationalist sentiments, such as Hizbollah. The group's religious base is 
demonstrated through its name, which translates into 'Party of God', but the group also 
relies heavily on the Arab ethnicity of its members for mobilization. 
4 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology that will be used for this analysis will rely heavily on the theory 
of mobilization. In order for the comparison of the effectiveness of two groups in 
mobilizing their resources to be made, a solid foundation in the basic principles of 
mobilization as a theory needs to be set down. Besides understanding the basic concepts 
behind mobilization, it is important to know how mobilization relates to the comparison 
of the two groups. Aspects of mobilization important for this comparison are how long 
an individual joins the group for, how completely does membership encompass an 
individual's everyday life or how easily does the individual's loyalty shift to another 
group or another cause. These aspects are important for determining how effectively a 
group mobilizes because they are a good indicator of an individual's level of 
commitment. It takes a great deal of commitment for an individual to join for a long 
time, to immerse himself or herself into the group completely and to have an unshakable 
loyalty to the group. This high level of individual dedication indicates that the group was 
able to effectively mobilize that individual into putting the group's interests ahead of self-
interest. A more detailed description of how mobilization will be measured for each 
group and why these standards of measurement are important will follow in the next 
chapter. These examples are just a few of the ways in which mobilization theory will be 
applied to the two groups in order to determine the effectiveness of each group in 
mobilizing its human resources. 
Certain problems exist in trying to compare class and ethnicity as mobilizing 
factors. The biggest limitation directly relates to how broad and varied terrorism is. An 
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indicator of the broad scope of terrorism is the lack of a specific and accurate definition. 
There are many definitions, most of which are correct but not expansive enough. These 
definitions reflect an emphasis on the aspects of terrorism that the author is interested in, 
but usually little more. Terrorism is such a varied topic that it is difficult to create a 
single definition for it, much less place it into a single category or use a single school of 
thought when analyzing it. The broad scope of terrorism makes the comparison of 
ethnicity and class as mobilizing factors difficult because more variables need to be 
factored out. Without specific parameters on terrorism, several considerations become 
important to the accurate comparison of the two groups. Factors taken into account for 
this comparison are the type of state that the group formed in, such as an industrializing 
state, a colonial state or a fledgling state; and the level of violence of the group. The type 
of state a group is formed in is important because a group forming in a colonial state will 
have different grievances and opposition than a group forming in an already developed, 
independent state. Level of violence of the group is important because 
uncharacteristically low levels of violence could be considered anarchistic acts or merely 
isolated acts of protest and extremely high levels of violence could be a civil war or coup 
attempt. These factors were removed from this comparison by selecting two groups with 
similar origins, located in Western European nations and utilizing similar levels of 
violence. 
Another limitation in the comparison is that there are other foundations for 
terrorist groups besides class and ethnicity, such as religion. These foundations often do 
not have well defined boundaries either. A certain group may be a combination of 
6 
multiple motivations, such as religion and ethnicity or even a combination of class and 
ethnicity. These hazy boundaries make the comparison more difficult and less accurate, 
but the two groups in this comparison were chosen with this consideration in mind. The 
Red Brigades has been considered a class-based group with negligible religious or ethnic 
influences. The ETA is not so clearly defined; during the formative period of the group, 
there was disagreement over whether to be an ethnically based group or a class-based 
group. For reasons that will be explained in the ETA case study, this group will be 
considered an ethnically based group. 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter IT will detail the theory and basic concepts of mobilization, its relation to 
terrorism and terrorist groups, and how it is used in the comparison between two terrorist 
groups. Chapter ill is a case study examining the Basque separatist group (ETA) in 
Spain. A brief background of the group will be followed by an application of the 
mobilization theory to this group and its resources. Chapter IV is a case study that will 
examine the Italian Red Brigades, an ideologically motivated left wing revolutionary 
group. Again, a brief background of the group will be given, followed by the 
mobilization theory applied to this group and its resources. Chapter V will examine the 
differences between the two groups and the respective application of the mobilization 
theory to each. Conclusions will be drawn about the effectiveness of each group in 
mobilizing. This may aid future predictions about the behavior or lifespan of terrorist 
groups. 
7 
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II. MOBILIZATION THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Successfully mobilizing resources is a critical prerequisite for any terrorist group 
that expects to have a reasonable chance of achieving its goals. In his book From 
Mobilization to Revolution, Charles Tilly states that without mobilization, a group cannot 
contend for power or exert influence over a group or government.3 The inability to 
contend for power or exert influence is a result of a lack of resources brought about by 
ineffective mobilization. And while resources are an important part of a terrorist group's 
struggle, one specific category of resources stands out from the rest, that is, human 
resources. A group's ability to mobilize its human resources goes a long way to 
determining the amount of success it can potentially enjoy. Conversely, a group's 
inability to effectively mobilize its resources is an early and clear indication that it will 
not survive. 4 
Predictions can be made about a group or the expected amount of success it will 
have in attaining its goals by judging its effectiveness in rallying support and enlisting 
new members. The first step in doing this is defining mobilization theory. The second 
step is putting the mobilization theory into context with regard to terrorist groups, 
including differentiating between the multiple levels and forms of mobilization and 




relating these various levels of mobilization to terrorist groups. The last step is to 
describe the means by which terrorist groups' ability to mobilize human resources will be 
judged. We will derive a list of factors from mobilization theory that can then be applied 
to a terrorist group in an effort to determine how effectively that group mobilizes its 
resources. On that basis, individual groups can be compared with each other in order to 
determine which group is a more effective mobilizer and thus is less likely to experience 
demobilization and subsequent demise. 
B. THE THEORY OF MOBILIZATION 
Mobilization is important not just to terrorist groups, but to any group seeking to 
voice its concern or achieve goals. The means a group uses might be different, ranging 
from peaceful demonstrations to protests to riots to armed action to terrorism, but each 
group requires effective mobilization of human resources to have an even remote chance 
of achieving success. According to Ted Robert Gurr, mobilization is the extent to which 
group members are prepared to commit their energies and resources to collective action 
on behalf of their common interests.5 A group's strength derives directly from this 
willingness on the part of an individual to voluntarily give his or her time and effort to 
the group. A slight modification on this definition of mobilization comes from Charles 
Tilly. He augments Gurr' s definition of mobilization as the willingness of individuals to 
sacrifice for the group by stating that mobilization is the extent that these resources are 
5 Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington D.C.: 
United States Insitute of Peace Press, 1993), 127. 
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under the collective control of the group. 6 According to Tilly, merely having a number 
of willing individuals subordinate to the leadership of the group is mobilization potential. 
Real mobilization is actual control of these assets to the degree that these resources will 
deliver the desired result when called upon to do so. 7 Control over these resources gives 
the group the capability to contend for power and exert influence. 
C. MOBILIZATION IN CONTEXT 
Mobilization is not a new concept; it has been recognized as an important element 
in early works on social movements and collective action. The spectrum of groups that 
the term social movement encompasses is very diverse, ranging from the peaceful to 
those that utilize violence, terrorism and rebellion. Social movements have been defined 
as "a deliberate collective endeavor to promote change in any direction and by any 
means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into 'utopian' 
community. "8 
Just as there are a wide variety of social movements, there are varying degrees of 
mobilization associated with the different type of social movements. A group that stages 
demonstrations or protest rallies requires a significantly lower amount of mobilization 
than a group that utilizes terrorism or has an ultimate goal of instigating rebellion. 9 A 
terrorist group is a group that requires an extreme commitment from its members to 
6 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 54. 
?Ibid., 69. 
8 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State. (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 27. 
9 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 189. 
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achieve the necessary level of mobilization. This includes not just those responsible for 
carrying out attacks but also those providing information, hiding weapons or even 
housing and feeding group members. Even though a terrorist group might have interests 
and objectives that are the same as those of an individual, a great deal is required to 
motivate that individual to accept the tremendous costs associated with being a member 
of a terrorist group. Costs of membership include being \Yanted by authoriti,es, isolation 
from family and society and even a strict and disciplined lifestyle dictated by the terrorist 
group. In order for the individual to accept these costs and join the group, the group 
needs to appeal to the individual strongly enough so that the individual puts aside his or 
her self-interests and adopts the interests and objectives of the group. Appealing to an 
individual's emotions and most deeply held sentiments is an effective and powerful way 
to convince the individual to put aside his or her self-interest and mobilize to support the 
cause of the group. 
Once a terrorist group has successfully mobilized resources, maintaining control 
over these resources becomes a major area of concern. The high level of mobilization 
required for groups with extreme means and aims is difficult to maintain and many 
groups do not succeed in maintaining that level of mobilization. These groups soon face 
demobilization as they can no longer elicit and control sufficient human resources to 
continue to survive. This struggle to survive and maintain a level of mobilization that 
will at least allow them to function at a minimal level becomes most terrorist groups' 
primary objective. Martha Crenshaw states that terrorist violence is an end in itself, with 
12 
the actual violence becoming increasingly meaningless to society.10 What Crenshaw is 
arguing here is that no matter what progresses a group makes in its struggle, the level of 
violence will remain high even if it is no longer accomplishing any meaningful purpose. 
The only purpose served at this point would be in essence to give the group something to 
do, for it can be argued that a group without anything to do faces the threat of stagnating 
and disbanding. Self-preservation becomes the primary goal of the terrorist group, 
replacing the goal of remedying the grievances that mobilized the group in the first place. 
Maintaining control over resources is not only a matter of preventing members 
from quitting but also a matter of preventing other groups from convincing members to 
change allegiance and offer up their efforts and support to the other group. The group 
most commonly loses contro.J over resources to other groups, factions of the main group 
or even splinter groups.11 Effective and sustained mobilization by the group requires that 
it form coalitions among diverse segments and contending leaders.12 A terrorist group is 
rarely a homogenous group of individuals who all think alike; typically a group is a 
collection of individuals or sub-groups with varying beliefs and opinions, with some sort 
of agreed upon common ground for the beliefs of the group. Although this sometimes 
requires concessions to be made and the acceptance of views and goals that aren't 
necessarily popular, it helps maintain the level of mobilization maintaining a single large 
10 Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 3, No. 1 
(Spring 1991): 83. 
11 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 76. 
12 Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, 127. 
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pool of human resources rather than a number of smaller pools consisting of competing 
groups, splinter groups or factions of the main group. The maintenance of the largest 
possible collective unit, although often times very difficult, is the most certain means of 
ensuring that mobilization is not lost through factionalization and defections.I3 
As stated earlier, the mobilization of resources by terrorist groups is both difficult 
to achieve and to maintain. It is also difficult to determine if a terrorist group is 
particularly effective at mobilizing resources or not, short of a group's complete 
demobilization, indicating a high degree of ineffectiveness. This analysis of groups' 
ability to mobilize their human resources will be based on three criteria: how inclusive 
group membership is of an individual's everyday life, the separation between a group's 
ideology and its common identity and finally how well the group frames its grievances 
and aims to increase the attractiveness of joining the group. These three criteria will be 
applied to both the ETA and Red Brigades is order to analyze each group's effectiveness 
at mobilization. The reason for the selection of these three criteria is to focus on the 
relationship between the individual and the group and to place minimal emphasis on the 
relationship between the group and outside factors such as other groups or the 
government. By concentrating on the relationship between the individual and the group, 
emphasis can be placed on the group's efforts to mobilize potential members and an 
analysis can be made of how effective the group is at accomplishing this mobilization. 
13 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd Ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 148. 
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D. MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENT FACTORS 
One of the toughest aspects of mobilization is judging how well a group does in 
mobilizing its resources. Although it is easy to determine that a defunct terrorist group 
did a poor job at mobilization and easy to determine that a terrorist group that is in the 
public consciousness and gaining new members is successful at mobilization, most 
terrorist groups fall somewhere in the middle, where it is harder to make an accurate 
judgment on the group's mobilization effectiveness. Accurate determination ofterrorist 
groups' ability to mobilize human resources requires careful consideration and study into 
its behavior, characteristics and history. 
The two groups studied in this thesis, one a class based group and the other an 
ethnically based group, will be analyzed based on three separate factors in an attempt to 
determine which of the two is more effective at mobilizing human resources. The first 
factor will be to determine how close membership in a group comes to absorbing the 
members' whole lives.I4 This is a good measure ofmobilization because membership in 
such a group requires a great deal of commitment on the part of the individual. The 
group must be effective at mobilization to convince the individual to give up a normal 
life and begin a life underground with minimal interaction with family, friends and 
society in general. The second factor will be whether the group has an ideology that is 
independent from its source of collective identity and what effect this has. An ideology 
separate from the group's identity allows the group flexibility in changing its ideology as 
it sees fit without changing the identity of the group, thus reducing the possibility of the 
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group facing the possible loss of support of the members who would no longer have a 
strong identification with the group. Although the possibility exists that the group would 
be able to replace the lost group of support with another supportive group, the repeated 
replacement of support does not promote a strong feeling of commitment to the group on 
the part of the members. The lack of strong commitment to the group is not effective 
mobilization. 
A group's identity and ideology are both important elements that help determine 
group objectives, targets and type of people that are recruited for membership. Identity is 
the characteristic of the group that gives the members a common bond. A group with a 
strong sense of identity has a strong union between members, even if the group has no 
particular grievances or objectives. Group's with strong senses of identity don't 
necessarily have strong senses of ideology; the members might have a strong bond strong 
with each other but no real objective towards which the group would fight. Examples of 
group identity are the Basque or Irish Catholic identity of the Euskadi ta Askatasuna 
(ETA or Basque Fatherland and Liberty) and Irish Republican Army (IRA), respectively, 
the laborer and student identity of the Red Brigades or the Islamic identity of the 
Hizbollah. Ideology gives a group a sense of purpose. A strong ideology gives the 
group a goal to strive for, such as the independence of an ethnic group, the overthrow of 
the capitalist government or the advancement of a religion over another. A group with a 
strong ideology does not necessarily have a strong identity; a group might have a strong 
ideology to give it a definite aim to its efforts, but a weak identity leading to little group 
14 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 64. 
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cohesion and sentiment of the individual towards the group. Examples of a group 
ideology are the Marxist-Leninist destruction of the capitalist governments and the 
protection of an ethnic group's territory and traditions as well as the creation of an 
independent or autonomous region for that ethnic group. 
The final factor in determining each group's effectiveness at mobilizing will be to 
analyze how each group frames its issues of contention; does the group fra:rp.e its interests 
with symbols that are traditional and elicit emotion, such as language or a historic event, 
or does the group frame its interests based on symbols that rely less on emotion and more 
on rewards, such as equal rights for all members of a certain class. IS 
According to Tilly, one of the most important methods for determining a group's 
efficiency at mobilizing is to analyze how inclusive of the individual's life is membership 
in the group.16 The standards that will be used to determine inclusiveness are the amount 
of time an individual has been a member of the group, the amount of energy devoted to 
the group including how much of his or her daily activity takes place within the group, 
the proportion of all social interaction between members and other people in which group 
membership is somehow relevant, how early of an age the group recruits from and 
finally, the ability of members to seek refuge and comfort from loved ones who are not 
members.17 The first standard, the length of an individual's membership, is important 
because the longer an individual has been a member of a terrorist group, the more likely 
15 Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd Ed., 109. 
16 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 64. 
171bid., 64. 
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that it is that that individual is a highly dedicated member and was effectively mobilized 
to join the group. The second standard, the amount of energy dedicated to the group, is 
important because high amounts of energy sacrificed for the group also indicate that the 
individual is committed to the group and was effectively mobilized by the group. The 
third standard, more plainly put, is the number of everyday social interactions that occur 
between group members and other people in which the group membership is involved. 
This is a good indicator of mobilization because a high proportion of social interactions 
between group members and other people that takes into account group membership 
indicates the high level of these individual's commitment to the group and a concern for 
it that is deeply rooted in their day-to-day lives. The fourth standard, age of recruits, is a 
good indicator because this demonstrates how readily youth accept the appeals the group 
makes to them. If younger and younger people accept the appeal the terrorist group has 
made to them, then these younger members are in the group from an earlier age and 
become more involved in the group. For these younger members, membership in the 
group becomes more inclusive. The final standard, the ability of members to seek refuge 
and comfort from loved ones who are not members, is good at demonstrating 
inclusiveness because an inability by group members to seek non-member support forces 
members to turn to fellow members, thus reinforcing the inclusiveness within everyday 
life. 
The second factor that will be examined will be whether or not the group has an 
ideology separate from its identity and what effect this has on the group. A group with an 
ideology separate from its identity has an ideology that can be modified without changing 
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the identity of the group. An example of this is a group with an identity of a common 
ethnic background and an unrelated ideology, such as the class-based promotion of 
workers' rights. The two case studies are opposites on this factor, and how each group 
fared in this will be used to help determine effectiveness at mobilization. A group 
mobilizes around certain interests and identities, and as time progresses, interests change. 
In fact, new interests that come about are often in direct conflict with interests around 
which the group was mobilized in the first place.I8 For example, most ofthe members of 
ETA have mobilized with the group based on their shared culture and ethnic identity as 
Basques. The interests of the group are defined, but are flexible to change or be 
modified, without conflicting with the mobilizing factors, that is, the identity of the 
group. A class-based group, such as the Red Brigade, has an ideology, with the 
associated interests, that is closely linked to its identity. With an ideology that is both the 
source ofthe group's mobilization of its members, and expression of its interests, there is 
little room for the group to be flexible and modify its ideology without facing the 
possibility of causing some alienation among the members that support the group based 
on their common identity. As will be seen, the Red Brigade had an identity of class-
based worker protection which doubled as its ideology. But when the group attempted to 
modify its ideology to include more emphasis for national revolution, the workers who 
formed the base of support for the group lost some of their sense of identity with the 
group. Because of this lack of flexibility between the group's ideology and identity, the 
radical change made to the ideology affected the identity of the group as well. 
18 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 57. 
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Subsequently, the group suffered a partial demobilization of its worker base of support. 
As the example showed, if a group's ideology were to change or be modified in any way, 
then there would be a difference between what the group was fighting for and what the 
members joined the group to fight for. If a significant part of the group's base of support 
was mobilized based on the original interests and the connected ideology, then the group 
would run the risk of witnessing a partial or even total demobilization of this now 
disenfranchised base of support once the group modified its ideology, and subsequently, 
its identity. 
The final factor in analyzing mobilization is to look at how both groups frame 
their grievances and aims in order to appeal to as many people as possible and gain 
maximum support. Both groups will be examined to determine if the group frames its 
issues based on symbols and culture or on incentives and rewards. Tarrow defines 
frames as a method of constructing a perspective or a meaning that resonates with a 
population's dispositions and communicates a uniform message.I9 In other words, how 
well a group constructs frames is how well the group is able to appeal to a population's 
predispositions and make the emotional connection to potential members. The very act 
of joining a terrorist group is a largely emotional act, so a very strong emotional 
connection is needed between the group and the potential member to overcome the 
hesitation the individual might have about making such a difficult decision. If a group 
can portray the issues and interests it is concerned with in an emotional manner that will 
stir up strong sentiments among potential members, it will have a greater chance of 
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overcoming the individual's hesitancy than less emotional appeals. A group's success at 
mobilizing resources might depend solely on the ability to frame the grievances and aims. 
If the group is able to frame its interests in such a way that appeals to emotion, it is likely 
the group will enjoy a high degree of mobilization. If that same group frames those same 
interests in a manner that does not appeal to the emotions and sentiments of the 
prospective members, the group will not experience much mobilization. This emotional 
attachment is a very powerful motivator, creating a psychological investment by the 
individual. Once that individual has been mobilized to join, the stronger the emotional 
connection, the longer the period oftime that individual is likely to remain in the group. 
The analysis of the mobilization effectiveness of the two groups in the case 
studies will be done by using the three determinants of mobilization that were laid out 
previously: how inclusive membership is to each individual's life, the separation of 
ideology and identity and what effect this has, and the framing of a group's interests and 
grievances. 
19 Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd Ed., 110. 
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III. THE BASQUE INSURGENT CASE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the last thirty years, Spain has experienced one of the highest levels of terrorist 
violence in all European countries due in most part to the Basque separatist group 
Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom, or ETA. )20 The ETA is an· 
ethnically based terrorist group. The group's goal has been independence or at least 
greater autonomy for the Basque region from the central Spanish government and it gets 
a majority of its support and members from the Basque community in the northern 
regions of Spain. In fact, the ETA and the Basque conflict with the Spanish government 
is a useful case study in the comparison of the ethnically based versus class based 
mobilization of resources because of the ETA's success in mobilization. The ETA has so 
successfully mobilized active members and support from the Basque community that the 
group has been able to survive years of continued operations and a constant and fierce 
opposition from the Spanish government. The ETA has gained significant levels of 
support from the Basque community for a period of time that has seen both the 
mobilization and demobilization of a number of class and ethnically based groups in 
Europe, making the ETA one of the most durable and effectively mobilized groups. 
During its years of operation, the ETA has remained flexible and adept at 
adjusting to changing conditions both within the group and in the Basque society. Since 
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its beginning, the ETA has faced an internal debate over following a nationalist or class 
based ideology but the group has always had an ethno-nationalist foundation first and 
foremost. In The Basque Insurgents, Robert Clark makes this distinction quite clear: 
"There is no question that the Basque struggle exemplifies ethnic nationalism in modem 
industrial society and that ETA exemplifies the use of armed assault to further ethnic 
nationalist aims."21 The Basque nationality is one of the ancient nationalities in Europe 
and is unlike any other; remnants of the civilization indicate that the group's origins date 
back as far as 20,000 B.C.22 While debate over ideologies divided the group several 
times, the ETA never wavered from its identity as a group fighting for ethnic Basque 
interests. 23 
B. ORIGINS OF BASQUE NATIONALITY 
Basque nationalism dates to the 191h century with the centralization and 
industrialization of the Basque region coupled with the Spanish attempts to unify the 
state.24 For the seven hundred years leading up to the 191h century, the reigning Spanish 
monarch granted substantial power of self-government to the different regions under 
20 Goldi Shabad and Francisco Jose Llera Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque 
Terrorism in Spain," In Terrorism in Context. Martha Crenshaw, ed. (University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 410. 
21 Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1984), 8. 
22 Ibid., 12. 
23 Ibid., 276. 
24 JamesAnderson, "Separatism and Devolution: the Basques in Spain," In Shared Space: Divided 
Space, Essays on Conflict and Territorial Organization. Michael Chisholm and David M. Smith, eds. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 139. 
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Madrid's control. During this period, the Basque region utilized its own language, laws, 
customs and cultural symbols while existing under the ultimate control of the Spanish 
monarchy. What developed was a strong sense of ethnicity within the Basque 
community. The sentiment of ethnicity may become ethnic nationalism when an outside 
force attempts to eliminate a group's sense of ethnicity through oppression. The need to 
protect its sense of ethnicity from elimination causes the ethnic group to perceive itself as 
a nation or nationality with a need for its own political structures to protect itself and 
even to provide a group with the incentive to demand its own sovereign state.25 The 
efforts of the Spanish state in the middle of the 19th century at centralization and 
industrialization led to several effects that changed Basque ethnic identity into ethnic 
nationalism. Industrialization was rather successful in the Basque region and created 
prosperity. However, this prosperity was enjoyed on a large scale by only a small group 
of industrialists and oligarchs who subsequently attempted to use their power to link 
more closely the Basque regions with the Spanish seat of power in an attempt to preserve 
this prosperity for the few. Although these oligarchs were Basques, they favored the 
Spanish industrialization because they stood to benefit. The remaining majority of 
Basques were left with little opportunity to benefit from this industrialization. This 
majority of people were the old economic base of the Basque region: the farmers and 
merchants who held strong ethnic sentiments. The intrusive Spanish industrialization 
threatened the nationalist group's economic well-being, which led to even stronger ethnic 
sentiments of 'Basques versus Spain' from the latter group. Attempts by the Basques 
25 Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980, 5. 
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farmers and merchants to benefit from the industrialization of their region exposed them 
to rampant Spanish exploitation and pollution of the Basque region. The direct threat to 
the Basque community carne in 1876 when the Spanish government took away the 
Basque's political rights of self-government. The formation in 1892 of the Basque 
Nationalist Party (PNV) was the political embodiment of the Basque concern for the 
protection of their collective identity and would be the "political vehicle by which 
Basque autonomy would eventually be obtained."26 
The next significant event that solidified the Basque sense of nationalism was the 
Spanish Civil War that broke out in July 1936. In the Civil War, the German bombing of 
the city of Guemica, historically symbolic of Basque independence, and the intense 
oppression of the emerging Franco regime were important to the solidification of the 
sentiments of nationalism. What was perceived by the Basques as industrial and 
economic exploitation of their provinces by Franco coupled with the immigration of 
thousands of Spanish workers into Basque territory to compete for scarce jobs and 
benefits did little to help Basques prosper economically. This continued Spanish 
economic success at the expense of the Basques further fueled the Basque nationalist 
sentiments that were mounting. More importantly, Franco attempted to "eradicate 
Basque distinctiveness once and for all and to create a 'single personality, Spanish'." 
Any public display or symbol of Basque political and cultural identity was repressed by 
the regime and led directly to the Basques viewing their lands as militarily occupied by 
26 Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980, 14. 
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an increasingly illegitimate Spanish state. 27 With all forms of ethnic identity and 
political expression of their grievances made illegal by the regime, younger Basque 
nationalists began to feel increasingly frustrated with both the Franco government and 
their own ineffective and sometimes exiled government. "Franco's often indiscriminate 
repression in the Basque country over the next four decades had the effect of 
transforming the forces of Basque nationalism. It resulted in the bulk of the population 
becoming more united politically than at any time before or since."28 This growing unity 
had no means of release, building to a point where the nationalists were more and more 
willing to go to extreme measures. The ethnic nationalism that emerged from the conflict 
with the Spanish state was in defense of the traditional society and would soon become 
extreme enough to facilitate the creation ofthe ETA.29 
C. THE FORMATION OF THE ETA 
Even though the repression of Franco's regime began in the summer of 1937, the 
ETA did not officially form until the summer of 1959. In the span of this time, several 
groups were formed to promote the Basque identity and to prevent the regime's 
repression from eradicating the Basque culture. In 1959, elements of these groups, 
mostly radical youths, broke away from their respective groups, claiming the established 
groups were too conservative and the older generations too passive. These fractionalized 
elements came together to form the ETA. From the beginning, the group "asserted 
27 Shabad and Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," 419. 
28 Anderson, "Separatism and Devolution: the Basques in Spain," 139. 
291bid., 141. 
27 
claims for the independence and the reunification of the Basque provinces, the defense of 
the Basque identity and language, the struggle against police repression and military 
occupation of the Basque country by the Spanish state, and solidarity with workers' 
demands."30 At this early stage, the ETA mobilized what support and members it had 
through their collective identity as Basques and specifically, through the identification 
and the need to protect the Basque language, Euskara. 31 Although the group had and still 
has decidedly nationalist foundations to its aims, the debate went on within the group 
about whether the group's organizing principles would be class based or ethnicity based. 
The ETA could organize on a class basis but still be considered an ethno-nationalist 
group for several reasons. First, the ideology of the class struggle originated out of the 
desire for the Basque workers to be rid of the oppressive conditions to which they were 
subjected under Spanish rule. Even though this was a class-based goal, it had the more 
important underlying nationalist sentiments of 'Basque versus Spain' to it. Second, the 
ETA always held the ethno-nationalist principle of independence for the Basque 
provinces above any other principle, especially the principle of class revolution. The 
principle of Basque independence has been a constant in Basque ideology and has 
historically been nearly non~negotiable during peace discussions between the Spanish 
government and the ETA and other Basque groups. Lastly, the ETA used ethnic identity 
and nationalism to mobilize significantly more frequently than it used class identity and 
30 Shabad and Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," 426. 
31 Cynthia L. Irvin, Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque 
Country. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 69. 
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leftist ideology. The few occasions of class mobilization used by the ETA are 
overshadowed by countless instances of the ETA utilizing nationalism, making it 
accurate to refer to the ETA as an ethno-national organization versus a combination 
ethno-national and class based organization. 32 
By the time the ETA had claimed its first victim in 1968, the group had already 
experienced five assemblies for ideological debate and had been a part of numerous 
strikes, labor unrests, demonstrations, distributions of ideological information and other 
non-violent activities.33 But despite the factionalizations and disagreements that occurred 
over the next decade, the degree of mobilization and support enjoyed by the group 
increased dramatically, demonstrated by the increasing numbers of active members in the 
group and the growing support from the Basque public. Between 1968 and 1973, the 
degree of mobilization was relatively low, with the organization tentatively becoming 
more active and utilizing more human resources. Between 1974 and 1977 the level of 
mobilization increased steadily until the period of 1978 through 1980, which was the 
ETA's most intense years with the highest amount of mobilization and the highest 
number of attacks and deaths. The periods of 1981 through 1987 witnessed a reduction 
in operations as mobilization tapered off from the 1978-1980 levels and finally the period 
beginning in 1988 when the degree of mobilization declined to the levels seen in the mid 
32 Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980, 275-276. 
33 Ibid., 35-48. 
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1970s.34 But even in the late 1980s, when the ETA was able to mobilize a dwindling 
number of new members, the group still had a significant amount of support from the 
Basque nationalist community, despite the growing public perception of the uselessness 
of the ETA violence in a time of restored of Basque autonomy from the Spanish 
government. 35 
By drawing upon the collective identification of the Basque culture, language and 
traditions and on the growing need to protect them from extinction, the ETA was able to 
mobilize members and support from the Basque nationalist community and sustain this 
level of mobilization for a significant length of time. By continuously mobilizing at an 
effective level, the group ensured itself of a longer life span and more opportunities to 
achieve its goals. 
D. EFFECTIVENESS AT MOBILIZATION EFFORTS 
As described earlier, the Basque culture is one of the oldest in Europe and has 
developed both a unique set of cultural characteristics and a deep tradition that is firmly 
embedded in Basque society. The ETA was successfully able to capitalize on this strong 
sense of collective identity and turn it into both members and support for the group and 
its actions. For the purposes of this thesis and the comparison that will be made to a class 
based terrorist group, the ETA's efforts at mobilization will be gauged using three tests. 
34 Robert P. Clark, Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975-1988. 
(Reno: University ofNevada Press, 1990), 15. 
35 Shabad and Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," 464. 
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The first will be to examine how completely an individual's membership in the group 
encompasses that person's daily life, including the length of time in the group, the length 
of time each day dedicated to the group, the number of everyday social interactions that 
occur between group members and other people in which the membership of the group is 
involved, how young of an age the group recruits, and the ability of members to seek 
comfort and refuge from those who are not members. The second test will be to evaluate 
the group's ideology and identity. If a group has an ideology (Marxism versus 
independence ofBasque region from Spain) that is independent of its identity (a worker's 
party versus Basque ethnicity), we can determine the effects that this separation of 
ideology and identity has on the group's ability to mobilize. A separation between 
ideology and identity allows a group flexibility in adapting its ideology to changing 
conditions, while maintaining a constant identity. A group can potentially change its 
ideology from class-based to nationalism and back, but if the group has an unchanging 
identity of ethnicity, it will be able to maintain its mobilization instead of alienating its 
members through changing ideologies. There is the possibility that a group might lose 
some members to the feelings of alienation and then be able to mobilize other people who 
might identify with the group. The danger with this repeated replacing of the core group 
of support every time the group decides to change ideology is that it does not foster an 
environment of commitment. This lack of strong commitment does not make for 
effective mobilization. The last test will judge how well the group frames and 
symbolizes its grievances. By effectively framing and symbolizing its grievances, the 
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group is able to make its goals and causes more attractive to a greater number of potential 
members or at least make the group cause seem more worthwhile to sympathizers. 
As explained in chapter two, when considering how completely an individual's 
membership in a terrorist group encompasses his or her daily life, there are a number of 
factors to be considered. These include the length of time in the group, the length of time 
each day dedicated to the group, the number of everyday interactions between members 
and others in which membership is somehow important, how young an age group the 
terrorist group recruits from (to determine how strongly youth accept the appeal of the 
group,) and finally, the ability of members to seek refuge and comfort from those who are 
not members (the inability of group members to seek refuge from those outside the group 
forces members to turn to fellow members for this refuge, increasing the degree to which 
membership encompasses that individual's life). 
Applying these factors to the ETA shows a high level of inclusiveness in 
everyday life, indicating effective mobilization at the individual level. While there is 
little data that shows the length of membership within the group, there are strong 
indications that membership in the group requires daily commitment. Interviews 
conducted for Robert Clark's The Basque Insurgents indicate that "after joining the 
organization their former friend and comrade seemed totally absorbed by his new 
responsibilities and duties" and "ETA has embedded itself organizationally in the 
everyday life of the Basque village."36 Individuals whose membership in the group is 
this inclusive are more likely to put more energy into what they're doing for the group 
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and to put more at risk for the group's interests. Furthermore, ETA has been successful in 
recruiting members at early ages, or at least presenting the group's cause in a manner that 
would gain sympathy from younger groups.37 An individual mobilized at an earlier age 
will be more likely to have the goals and interests of the group ingrained more deeply 
than an individual who is mobilized at a later age. Since the Basque community deeply 
values family and is tightly knit, ETA members have been able to maintain support and 
find refuge with not only their immediate families, but their local communities as well, 
even if the community does not have very many actual members in the ETA. ETA 
members being supported by their families and communities shows a high level of 
support that is generated for the group. Membership in the group that requires much of a 
member's energy and time, the involvement of younger and younger recruits and a strong 
appeal to the Basque community's sense of family has enabled the ETA to mobilize 
members successfully and to high levels of commitment. 
The next test to be applied to the ETA is whether the group has an identity 
independent of its ideology. The ETA has an identity separate from its ideology, which 
allows the group flexibility in its ideology. The ability to maintain a constant identity 
while being able to modify it.s ideology enables the group to appeal to people with both 
ethnically based and class-based grievances and potentially achieve a higher degree of 
mobilization. The very debates that took place within the ETA leadership about whether 
to adopt a Marxist ideology versus an ideology of earning Basque independence from 
36 Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980, 161. 
37lbid., 144. 
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Spain is proof of the group's separation of identity from ideology. During the time that 
the group's ideology was not decided upon, the group maintained the same identity, that 
is, an identity of an ethno-nationalist based group focused on the common identity of its 
Basque members. And during this period, the group enjoyed fairly high levels of 
mobilization, indicating that the identity of the ETA as an ethno-national group was more 
important for mobilization than the ideology of the group, which vacillated back and 
forth.38 A group with its identity connected to its ideology, such as a group with an 
identity of a Marxist social revolutionary group and an ideology of Marxist social 
revolution, runs the risk of facing an inability to mobilize resources based on its identity 
if its related ideology is discredited or undergoes a period of unpopularity. A group such 
as the ETA, however, can maintain its identity as an ethno-nationalist group and utilize 
multiple ideologies such as Marxism or Basque independence in order to remain flexible 
and appeal to a greater section of the community. 39 A potential member or sympathizer 
can be either a Basque nationalist or interested in the class-based workers' revolution if 
the ETA has the identity of the Basque nationalist protector while simultaneously part of 
its ideology includes the instigation of a class based revolution. The flexibility of this 
separation allows for higher levels of mobilization. 
The final test to be used on the ETA is to determine how well the group frames 
and symbolizes its grievances. Framing and symbolizing grievances is important because 
it makes the goals and interests of the group appeal to a greater section of people. If a 
38 Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980, 261. 
39 Irvin, Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country, 43. 
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group can package and present itself and what it is striving for in such a way that has an 
appeal to the widest possible group of people, the levels of mobilization will increase for 
that group. Joining a group that engages in activities as extreme as terrorism is obviously 
an emotional decision that involves a great deal of commitment and willingness to 
sacrifice on the part of the individual. If a group can frame its objectives in such a 
manner as to appeal on the emotional level to the individual, mobili.zation of that 
individual will be more likely. The ETA provides a powerful example of doing this 
successfully. Preserving their culture and traditions is a rational objective, but by 
framing this goal in a more emotional context, by declaring for example that they stand 
for the protection of the Basque language, Euskera, against the destructive efforts of the 
occupational forces of the Spanish oppressors, the ETA is able to make the same 
objective more urgent and resonate more loudly with a greater number ofBasques.40 The 
ETA was exceptionally successful at this during the Franco regime, during which all 
aspects of the conflict between the Basque nationalists and the Spanish government were 
converted into a matter of cultural and ethnic survival for the Basques.4 1 The successful 
utilization of symbols and the framing of a group's interests and objectives in an 
emotional manner is an effective method of mobilization. In Militant Nationalism, 
Cynthia Irvin writes that "exclusive control of symbols is therefore of utmost concern and 
importance to the leaders of nationalist movement organizations, since they seek to use 
40 Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980, 33. 
41 Shabad and Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," 424. 
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these symbols to mobilize their constituency and expand their movement."42 This was 
something that has been successfully accomplished by the ETA during nearly its entire 
lifespan. The group's ability to put its grievances and objectives in a frame of reference 
that the largest number of individuals can identify with has allowed the group to mobilize 
successfully. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The ETA has been able to maintain high levels of mobilization of its human 
resources through all three methods examined here. The high degree of inclusiveness for 
a member of the group, the ability of the group to draw in potential members with its 
identity while remaining flexible with its ideology and the success the ETA has had in 
presenting its objectives and grievances in an emotional and urgent manner to a 
maximum number of potential members and supporters are three causes for this success. 
A terrorist group is nothing more than a complex organization that is formed as a rational 
response to a set of environmental circumstances or problems.43 Once the group is 
formed as a response, it attempts to achieve a specific objective to solve the problem. 
Through mobilization, the ETA maintained its operations for such an extended period of 
time that it has had the opportunity to affect the course of events in Spain to a degree that 
many terrorist groups have not had in their respective countries. 
42 Irvin, Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country, 17. 
43 Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980, 276. 
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IV. THE ITALIAN RED BRIGADES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Italy has had a history of a high level of political violence with the exception of 
21 years under a fascist dictatorship. Early examples of political unrest and violence date 
back as far as 1860 and historically there has been a politically based incident of.violence 
at least once every two years, with the exception of the years with a fascist government.44 
Throughout the years, the citizens of Italy have demonstrated more political awareness 
and participation than the citizens of many other nations. Instead of the malaise or apathy 
towards politics that affects the populace of other nations, Italians have traditionally 
placed a great deal of importance on involvement and activity in the political realm. Not 
only has Italian society placed emphasis on involvement, but it has also placed a great 
deal of emphasis on an individual's political identity; that is, not just being aware of the 
system, but choosing a set of political values and beliefs and holding on to them.45 With 
this strong politicization of society has come a high degree of violence and armed 
conflict, as well as a degree of acceptance of this violence. 46 This politicization of Italian 
society coupled with an acceptance of a certain amount of associated violence has created 
a culture of conflict, which has proven to be fertile ground for the creation of terrorist 
44 Leonard Weinberg and William Lee Eubank, The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism. (London: 
Westview Press, 1987), 20. 
45 Donatella Della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," In Terrorism in Context. Martha Crenshaw, 
ed. (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 143. 
46 Ibid., 144. 
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groups.47 Italy has experienced almost every form of terrorism and from almost every 
source, from anarchists assassinating King Umberto I at the beginning of the century to 
neo-Fascist and Marxist-Leninist terrorism towards the end of the century.48 
The Italian experience with terrorism is unique compared to the experiences of 
other European nations for several reasons. First, the strength and the impact of right 
wing terrorists were greater than in any other European nation. The interaction and 
competition between the left wing and right wing terrorist groups had a significant impact 
on the way both groups and the government developed and operated. Another difference 
that distinguished the Italian experience from others was the sheer number of 
revolutionary left wing terrorists. Although countries like Germany, Japan and the 
United States all had left wing terrorists, no other country had as many groups with as 
many members as Italy did.49 The large numbers of left wing terrorists in Italy increased 
the threat posed to the security of the government as well as its citizens. The large 
numbers of terrorists also allowed groups an increased ability to conduct operations for 
longer periods of time and to remain in the forefront of the Italian consciousness for a 
longer period of time. The groups of Italy had such large memberships that the typical 
47 Ibid., 112. 
48 Vittorfranco S. Pisano, Contemporary Italian Terrorism: Analysis and Countermeasures. 
(Washington D.C.: Library of Congress Law Library, 1979), 29. 
49 Weinberg and Eubank, The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism, 3. 
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losses in membership, due to arrests, defections, death, etc. did not impact the Italian 
groups' personnel resources as significantly as it did on other European groups. 
A critical element in the emergence of right wing and especially left wing terrorist 
groups was the development of strong sentiments for both the right wing fascist 
movement and the left wing Marxist-Leninist movement. Both of these sentiments have 
deep roots in Italian society, but the left wing movement gained significantly more 
support from its respective segment of Italian society following the events of World War 
Two. The historic episodes of the Italian left fighting against the fascists during the war 
increased the leftist movement's following amongst the people for the next half 
century. 50 From World War Two on, the leftist movement evolved and grew and 
eventually became the source of the many left wing terrorist groups that plagued Italy, 
most significantly among them, the Red Brigade. An examination of the origins of the 
Italian leftist movement is necessary for a better understanding of the reasons behind the 
founding of the Red Brigade. 
B. THE ORIGINS OF THE ITALIAN LEFTIST MOVEMENT 
The date most commonly associated with the beginning of the modem era of 
terrorist violence in Italy is December 12, 1969. On that date, a bomb planted by right 
wing extremists exploded in the Piazza Fontana office of the National Agricultural Bank 
50 Leonard Weinberg, "The Violent Life: Left- and Right-Wing Terrorism in Italy," In Political 
Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations. Peter Merkl, ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1986), 147. 
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in Milan.51 Although this bombing was the action of right wing extremists, it was 
important event in the development of the left wing movement. The bombing was not a 
spontaneous act; it was merely the culmination of years of mounting unrest that were 
finally acted upon. The bombing would directly lead to an escalation in the number and 
lethality of attacks by both sides. The deeply held sentiments of both the right wing and 
left wing movements had been developing for many years and the escalation in 1969 and 
1970 was the beginning in a rise of terrorism that would last into the eighties. 
The decade of the nineteen sixties were the most important in the development 
and growth of leftist sentiments in Italy, but there were also two significant events that 
aided in the growth of the Leftist movement: the end of World War Two and the events 
of 1956. At the end of the war, Italy was a defeated country and its citizens wanted to put 
both the defeat of the war and twenty years of oppressive government behind them. 
During this time, it was relatively easy for any movement or political party that wasn't 
Fascist to gain support from the people. Drawing on the support for leftist parties dating 
back to the beginning of the century coupled with the appeal of anything not Fascist, the 
Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) were able to gain 
more public support and influence than they had at any previous time. 52 From this point 
on, the Italian Left built its momentum with the events that occurred in 1956. In that 
year, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's report to the Communist party revealed the true 
51 Ibid., 145. 
52 Richard Drake, The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in Contemporary Italy. (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1989), 7. 
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horror of Joseph Stalin's government and especially the crimes committed during his 
purge trials and his distortions of history. The news of these revelations caused many 
Communists throughout the world to rethink their allegiance to Stalinism, but the true 
break between these Communists and the Soviet Union occurred with the Soviet 
repression of the Hungarian uprising later that year.53 This event made clear, especially 
to Italian Communists, that both Stalin's form of Communism and the post-Stalin form of 
Communism were oppressive and corrupt. This public break with Soviet Communism 
made the PCI much less menacing and more appealing to the Italian public, who wanted 
both Western prosperity and a form of government that was as far removed from Fascism 
as possible. Thus, after 1956, the Italian leftist movement would be a rare but important 
combination of a radical, and sometimes revolutionary, left wing movement, which was 
not associated with the increasingly menacing Soviet left wing revolutionary movement. 
In the 1960's, another development occurred that would eventually lead the 
extremists and revolutionaries within the left movement to create their own factions and 
subsequently, left wing terrorist groups, including the Red Brigade. In the aftermath of 
the disillusionment of the Italian leftists with the Soviet form of Communism, the leftist 
intellectuals in Italy began to rethink their ideology and the direction in which the left 
should be heading. These intellectuals expressed themselves through the publication of 
journals such as Quaderni Rossi, Quaderni Piacentini, Classe Operaio and . Scienza 
Operaia. These journals expressed the desire of the intellectuals to reject both Stalinism 
and the temptation to cooperate with the Democratic government and thus, lose the 
53Jbid, 39 
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revolutionary Marxist drive within the movement.54 In the early nineteen sixties, the 
Italian government involved the socialist party in the government in an attempt to open 
up to the left and gain the support of the socialists. Although this allowed the left more 
access to the government than it had previously enjoyed, it was also fuel to the more 
extremist members of the left, who felt any acknowledgment or involvement with a 
government that was not revolutionary was to give up the Marxist fight. Outraged at this 
apparent betrayal, some of the more radical members of the left, motivated by more 
radical journals, created in 1966 a more revolutionary Communist Party55 The 
Communist Party of Italy Marxist-Leninist (PC d'l (M-L)) became a critical component 
of the leftist movement when students from the University of Trento, including several 
that would go on to form the Red Brigade, joined. This party did not receive much initial 
support from the workers despite the promotion of the Italian worker to the forefront of 
the PC d'I (M-L)'s efforts. This initial lack of support from the workers was mainly due 
to the workers' sentiment that the party was a group of intellectuals and ideologues 
without much connection to the worker's grievances. The party did however, have strong 
support from students, and once the student protest grew, the PC d'l (M-L) was the 
critical component that created a unifying bond between the students and the workers. 56 
Although France is generally credited with being the birthplace of the 1968 student 
54 Weinberg and Eubank, The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism, 54. 
55 Pisano, Contemporary Italian Terrorism: Analysis and Countermeasures, 41. 
56 Alison Jamieson, The Heart Attacked: Terrorism and Conflict in the Italian State. (London: Marion 
Boyars Publishers, 1989), 50. 
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uprisings in Europe, there were already strong currents of student discontent in Italy in 
early 1967. The protests that erupted in Italian universities in 1968 were due to massive 
dissatisfaction with the institutions: higher costs of tuition, more students with no 
provisions, no guaranteed diplomas for finishing the requirement and a generally archaic 
system. As the pitch of the student revolt rose, the leaders of the leftist movement moved 
the protest outside the university to the factory, the home of the Italian proletariat, the 
worker. After the student uprisings of 1968, the apex of the worker unrest came in the 
'hot autumn' of 1969, when workers in northern Italy staged strikers, created disorder 
and even committed sabotage. In contrast to what occurred in other countries, the spread 
of protest from the university to the factory brought with it closer ties between the student 
and the worker. 57 This growing leftist movement did not intend to create terrorist groups 
such as the Red Brigade. It believed instead that a revolution of the masses would be the 
method for overthrowing the government. The creation of the terrorist groups was 
brought on by groups of revolutionaries who felt the existing leftist movement was not 
extreme enough or committed enough to bring about the revolution. Another reason for 
the emergence of left wing terrorist groups was ironically enough, the reemergence of 
extremist right wing Fascists. With the success of the left wing in gaining support from 
both the workers and the students, the Fascists felt a need to respond to the success of 
their political rivals. 
57 Donatella Dellaporta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis 
of Italy and Germany. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 27. 
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C. THE FORMATION OF THE RED BRIGADES 
As was mentioned earlier, the generally accepted birth date of modem Italian 
terrorism was December 12, 1969, when a bomb exploded in Milan. At first, left wing 
terrorist were accused of the bombing, but later it was blamed on right wing Fascists, 
whose 'strategy of tension' was intended to create such a high degree of public fear of 
terrorism that the public would accept another right wing oppressive government in order 
to combat the threat of terrorism. This attack by the right wing was in direct response to 
the success that the left wing was having in obtaining concessions from the government 
during their protests. The attack by the Fascists had the effect of catalyzing the more 
extreme members of the left to commit to action. The attack put the threat posed by the 
fascists into a tangible form that gave the left a sense of urgency in formulating a 
response. This threat posed by the fascists coupled with the frustrations of the more 
moderate factions of the leftist movement mobilized the revolutionaries of the left, and 
the Red Brigade was bom.58 
Two of the founders and early leaders ofthe Red Brigade were Renate Curcio and 
his wife, Margherita Cagol. They met at the University of Trento where they both 
studied sociology and were soon immersed in the development of revolutionary ideals 
that would later drive the formation of the Red Brigade. They left the university in 1969 
and moved to Milan to be closer to the worker's movement. In November, Curcio, Cagol 
and roughly 70 other like-minded individuals met to discuss taking the efforts of the 
58 Jamieson, The Heart Attacked: Terrorism and Conflict in the Italian State, 60. 
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movement further and taking advantage of the opportunities for more extreme armed 
resistance. Curcio desired a movement, launched against not just the factory but against 
the entire establishment that would lead to a total European revolutionary struggle. 59 The 
right wing bombing in Milan occurred one month after the meeting and from here a split 
within this group took place. One faction, led by Curcio, believed the bombing was all 
that was needed to begin the armed resistance. The other faction was more moderate in 
their thinking and so until October of 1970, this moderate group engaged mainly in 
discussion and the distribution of propaganda leaflets. In October of 1970, the creation of 
the Red Brigade was formally announced by the more radical faction as "the most 
decisive and conscious part of the proletariat in struggle against the institutions that 
administer the exploitation of the people."60 From here, the organization became 
significantly more militant in a short amount of time, calling for the education of the 
proletariat through armed struggle, which they considered the only acceptable means of 
ending the oppression of the masses. The initial strategy of the Red Brigade was armed 
propaganda. It was a combination of clandestine attacks against vehicles and private 
property belonging to industrial executives, known conservatives and rightist activists 
followed by the open distribution of explanatory literature. The aim of this practice was 
to raise the consciousness of the citizens and to "contribute to the formation of an elite 
59 Pisano, Contemporary Italian Terrorism: Analysis and Countermeasures, 45. 
60 Drake, The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in Contemporary Italy, 10. 
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that would later give birth to a truly combatant communist party."61 These attacks took 
place in the Milan area due to an early lack of support in other areas, such as Rome, and 
were intentionally bloodless. During this period, the Red Brigade was not a completely 
clandestine group. Members of the group would publicly hand out propaganda after an 
action but this was short lived due to many arrests of group members and soon the group 
went completely underground.62 
Once the group went completely clandestine, it expanded operations to other 
cities besides Milan, including Turin and Genoa. This expansion was an attempt to 
increase the area affected by Red Brigade actions and make a larger number of people 
aware of the group and its grievances. The expansion in area of operations was in effect 
a substitute for handing out propaganda, which the group no longer did because it went 
completely clandestine. The Red Brigade escalated from its symbolic and sporadic 
actions against property to political kidnapping, with the first action occurring in March 
of 1972, when a manager of an electric company was kidnapped for under an hour and 
subjected to a mock trial against the working class. Four more similar political 
kidnappings occurred through the end of 1973, and in April of 1974, the Red Brigade 
carried out their most symbolic and ambitious action yet. On April 18, the Red Brigade 
committed itself to strike at the heart of the state with the kidnapping of state prosecutor, 
Mario Sossi, in Genoa. This action took the Red Brigade away from the factories and the 
61 Michael Wieviorka, The Making ofTerrorism. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 
84. 
62 Weinberg and Eubank, The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism, 61. 
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local businesses and into direct confrontation with the state. 63 This shift by the Red 
Brigades coincided with a social and political transformation that occurred over the next 
two years, to the benefit of the group. During this time, a crisis in the labor movement 
radicalized many members who either felt themselves abandoned by increasingly 
politicized trade unions, left the union because they were unskilled or were victims of 
partial unemployment. The Red Brigade enjoyed increased support due to this crisis but 
at the same time, faced the imprisonment of many of their founding leaders and an 
escalation in the bloodshed of the conflict.64 The rest of 1974 saw the arrest of many of 
the key leadership, including Curcio, the first murders carried out by the Red Brigade and 
the first member of the group to be killed. Although the Red Brigade successfully sprang 
Curcio from prison, the group did not have much better luck in 1975 than it did in 1974 
with additional arrests and the death of Curcio's wife. Curcio was himselfrecaptured in 
early 1976 and the Red Brigade appeared as if it could no longer continue operations. 
However, the end of the 1970's saw a revitalization of the Red Brigade and a vast 
increase in the amount and lethality of violence. 65 Under new leaders, the Red Brigade 
began a terror campaign that included the murder of Genoa Attorney General Francesco 
Coco and near daily attacks of some degree. This campaign was so effective that the trial 
63 Jamieson, The Heart Attacked: Terrorism and Conflict in the Italian State, 83. 
64 Wieviorka, The Making of Terrorism, 86. 
65 Weinberg and Eubank, The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism, 64. 
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of Curcio set to begin in Turin was postponed due to an inability to find willing jurors.66 
The Red Brigade's most significant action took place on March 16, 1978 with the 
kidnapping and subsequent murder of Aldo Moro, the former Prime Minister and senior 
Christian Democrat leader. Although a military victory for the group, the action was 
definitely not a political victory. After the murder of Moro, most of the public 
denounced the Red Brigade for the senseless murder and within the group, a process of 
fragmentation began. A number of militants left the group as a demonstration of their 
disgust over the increasing levels of violence the group was committing. In fact, the 
entire branch of the organization in Milan broke from central direction, accusing the 
group of having lost all links to the working class.67 Despite this, the number of attacks 
actually increased in the next several years, mostly in the form of attacks on police 
officers. The years of 1978, 1979 and 1980 saw a high number of deaths and injuries, but 
the group clearly lost support and capability after this, as shown by the sharp decrease in 
the number of deaths and injuries in 1981 and 1982. By this time, the group was on the 
defensive, fighting for its life. The targets of the group were selected with the aim of 
group-preservation, with almost no consideration given to the symbolic character of the 
targets, an approach that typified the earlier attacks. More attacks were carried out 
against officials and police officers who were part of the anti-terrorism efforts. The 
symbolic value of striking against a policeman or government official who worked for 
66 Drake, The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in Contemporary Italy, 27. 
67 Weinberg and Eubank, The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism, 70. 
48 
the state was unintentional; the true intention of the attack was to reduce the numbers of 
personnel that these anti-terrorism agencies and efforts had at their disposal. Although 
attacks continued even past the February, 1984 assassination of American diplomat 
Leamon Hunt and the Red Brigade never officially announced the end of its struggle, it 
was clear that these attacks were carried out by radicals who were no longer part of a 
group but were instead individuals carrying out an attack on their own, in the hopes of 
keeping the name of the organization alive.68 
D. EFFECTIVENESS AT MOBILIZATION EFFORTS 
Italian terrorist groups have been able to take advantage of the high degree of 
politicization of Italian society and the general acceptance of some level of violence to 
mobilize support and increase their resources. The Red Brigade was especially 
successful in mobilizing support; the group was able to continue operations in some form 
as a terrorist organization until 1984. In the few years before 1984 and in the years after, 
the Red Brigade faced a diminishing ability to mobilize its resources and by the middle of 
the eighties, the group was represented by radicalized individuals whose only goal was to 
preserve the name of the Red Brigade through individual action. The Red Brigade 
originated from student movements, which then spread to labor movements in the 
factories of northern Italy, which is where it was to subsequently get a majority of its new 
members and support.69 In order to make a judgment on the Red Brigade's effectiveness 
68 Ibid., 73. 
69 Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy 
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at mobilization, the three tests used previously will be applied: how inclusive the group 
and membership in it was of a member's everyday life, the separation between the 
group's ideology and identity and finally, how effectively the group frames its grievances 
and issues of contention. 
In determining how completely an individual's membership encompasses daily 
life, the same criteria from the previous case study will be used: length of time in group, 
length of time each day dedicated to the group, the number of everyday social 
interactions that occur between group members and other people in which the 
membership of the group is somehow relevant, how early of an age group the terrorist 
group recruits from (to determine how strongly youth accept the appeal of the group,) and 
finally, the ability of members to seek refuge and comfort from those who are not 
members. Taken together, these factors indicate how effectively the individual is 
mobilized to support the group and the degree to which the individual is committed to the 
group. For the Red Brigade, membership in the group entailed a very high degree of 
inclusiveness of every day life. Although data on the average length of time in the group 
of an individual was unavailable, significant data was available, detailing the day-to-day 
activities of members. The group required its regular members to be engaged full time in 
the organization, live underground to avoid police detection and pursuit and to give up 
any regularly held jobs that were unrelated to the groupJO The irregular militants, 
70 Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy 
and Germany, 115. 
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responsible for support to the group but who had no direct involvement in actions, were 
allowed to live with their families and maintain normal lives outside of their group duties. 
The number of everyday social interactions that occurred between group members and 
other people in which membership was relevant was low, due to the high isolation of the 
members from day to day society. Without being able to live with their families or be 
employed in jobs unrelated to the group, members had little interaction with anyone 
besides fellow members. The recruitment age of the group varied, but due in part to the 
connection to the student movement, there were a sizable number of members who were 
fairly young. The appeal of the group was rather high with the youth movements ofltaly 
due to the Red Brigades action oriented ideology along with the connection to the student 
movement. Lastly, the ability of the group to take refuge and comfort from non-members 
was fairly low because of both the isolated nature of the group and the lack of 
identification between the average non-member and the group member seeking shelter. 
The degree of isolation of the group members is a dominant theme in day-to-day 
membership and it was both beneficial and detrimental. Isolation was beneficial because 
it allowed for greater security to surround the group and because it led directly to a strong 
feeling of identification with ~he group, which translated to a persistence of commitment 
and a mobilization of an individual for a longer period of time.? I The detrimental aspects 
of the extreme degree of isolation of the group include a more arduous and cautious 
71 Della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," 158. 
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lifestyle, difficulty in recruiting due to lack of exposure to potential members, and a 
growing amount of political ignorance within the group about what is going on in the 
society, resulting in a skewed sense of reality. These problems caused by isolation can 
lead to members of the group wanting to leave in order to lead lives that require less 
personal sacrifice. Another possibility isolation raises is that members of a group could 
remain mobilized, but due to the ensuing political ignorance and errors in judgment, the 
members could become ineffective or counterproductive members of the group. The 
greater the extent to which members have a skewed sense of reality increases the 
likelihood that members of the group will use this skewed sense to form opinions that are 
different from the interests of the group. The danger with this is these members could 
cause internal dissent, begin calling for actions that in reality would cost the group 
support or at worst, commit one ofthese actions in the name of the group. 
The next test of the group's effectiveness at mobilization is the evaluation of the 
separation between group identity and ideology. Unlike the ETA, which had a common 
identity of ethnicity and a separate ideology that shifted between ethnically based and 
class based aims, the Red Brigade's identity as a class based group is the same as its 
ideology. When both the identity and ideology are the same, there is little or no room for 
flexibility to adjust to changes in the political and cultural environment. The problem 
this can present for mobilizing resources is best exemplified by the loss of support the 
Red Brigade faced when its ideology of protecting the working class at the factory level 
shifted to bringing down the Italian state at the national level. The ideology of the group 
changed from being the protector of the proletariat to being the instigator of national 
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revolution, yet its identity remained as the group representing the oppressed classes. This 
led to accusations that the Red Brigade had lost touch with those it was originally 
fighting for and those that had given the group its initial support.72 Despite the group's 
insistence that its revolutionary foundation was the same, the isolation felt by the laborers 
as the group moved to a more national focus cost the Red Brigade the mobilization of 
potential members and supports.73 Without much separation between its ideology and its 
identity, the Red Brigade's ability to mobilize suffered because any shift in its ideology 
to adapt to changing situations or to expand the scope of its goals resulted in the isolation 
and withdrawal of members who felt they no longer had the same identity as the group. 
The final method in determining effectiveness at mobilization is to analyze how 
well the group frames and symbolizes its grievances and its aims. Framing is how a 
group presents its grievances and issues of contention, similar to packaging an opinion in 
order to make it more appealing to a larger group of people. By framing its grievances 
and aims effectively, a group can make joining it or supporting it much more attractive 
and make the costs associated with membership seem unimportant. The Red Brigade was 
effective at framing and symbolizing its grievances and ideology early on, but once the 
group became increasingly isolated and began committing what was perceived as 
excessive and unnecessary violence, its attempts at framing were no longer effective at 
72 Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy 
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mobilizing resources. Originally, the group was able to successfully frame the armed 
struggle and violence of the group as retribution for injustices and evils that had been 
done to the group. The group was also successful at portraying the armed violence it 
carried out not as terrorism, but as a struggle of heroic proportions equal to the Italian 
partisans fighting against fascists in World War Two. 74 An attempt at symbolization 
occurred as the group began to decline; the group began to think of its members as 
freedom fighters, in an attempt to romanticize the notion of a terrorist in a losing cause. 75 
Once the group began to commit increasingly more violent acts with the only apparent 
purpose of preventing the extinction of the group, it became nearly impossible to frame 
this direction of the group in such a way as to be acceptable by a wide range of people. 
These senselessly violent attacks were hardly justified by Marxist-Leninist ideology so 
the group was forced to create their own revolutionary language and justifications for the 
violence. This language was comprehensible only to the members, reducing to nothing 
the possibility that this message would be understood and accepted outside of the 
group.76 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The Red Brigade had mixed success in mobilizing its resources. Although the 
daily life of a member was thoroughly immersed in the group, ensuring that particular 
member's complete mobilization, the group became so isolated that the potential for 
extending this involvement of group membership to others outside the group became 
nearly non-existent. The Red Brigade did not have much success maif!.taining 
mobilization when it decided to modify its ideology. When it shifted its focus from the 
factory level and being the champion of the laborer to the nationai level and being the 
impetus for national revolution, it maintained the same identity which resulted in 
accusations of losing touch with the group of society that the group claimed to be 
protecting. Although there was support for the BR, there wasn't the level of grievances 
among the people to support a national campaign of extreme violence and terror directed 
at the state. Lastly, the group was origimilly able to successfully frame the grievances 
and aims of the group by claiming that armed struggle was merely retribution for the 
injustices done to them historically and that the struggle was not terrorism but instead a 
war of noble proportions on par with the fight against fascists in World War Two. But 
once the group began its unpopular campaign of violence, there was little it could do to 
successfully frame its grievances. By then, the group had already gone past the level of 
violence that could be reasonably justified, and the group attempted to create its own 
revolutionary language to justify its actions. The resulting incomprehensible language 
further isolated the group and led to further demobilization of its resources and support. 
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The successful framing of the campaign of violence was an impossible task; the level of 
grievances was not present to support a national campaign of violence aimed at the state. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. RELEVANCE OF COMPARISON 
The evaluation of a terrorist groups' ability to mobilize its human resources is an 
important step in gaining knowledge of a group and its operations. Terrorist groups are 
clandestine groups; they are almost always groups about which little is known. To 
combat or reduce the threat of a terrorist group, there must be an understanding of the 
group and an ability to make reasonably accurate predictions that would aid in the effort 
against terrorism. A knowledge of how effectively a group mobilizes its human 
resources is important for determining the size. of the personnel base the group has to 
work with, how dedicated these personnel are, the amount of support the group has from 
non-members and even the amount of time the average member has been with a terrorist 
group. When one group's effectiveness at mobilization is compared to another group's 
effectiveness, predictions can be made about the groups. For example, a group that is 
more effective at mobilization than another can be predicted to be less likely to have its 
members lose focus or interest in the group. This information would be helpful in 
formulating a plan to combat the terrorist groups: to destroy a group more effective at 
mobilization, more effort and resources would be required than to eradicate a group less 
effective at mobilization. Other predictions could be made based on a comparison of two 
groups' ability to mobilize resources; judgments could be made on how likely a group 
would be to lose support and possibly members if its ideology changed or if the political 
environment changed, how motivated the members would be to persist through the deaths 
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or arrests of their leaders, or even how apt members would be to stay loyal to the group 
or to leave and join another faction based on needs and grievances. Although a 
comparison of only two terrorist groups will not give definitive criteria to apply to other 
terrorist groups, it will at least demonstrate the process and the usefulness in judging one 
group's effectiveness in mobilizing human resources over another group's effectiveness. 
B. CLASS VERSUS ETHNICITY IN MOBILIZATION 
The two terrorist groups selected for this thesis, the Basque separatist group 
Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Italian Marxist Leninist group Red Brigade (BR), 
were analyzed separately for mobilization effectiveness in chapters three and four, 
respectively. The three factors used in the case studies to determine group effectiveness 
will be the basis for the comparison between the two groups. The first of the three factors 
is how much of everyday life takes place inside the group (including amount of time each 
day membership requires, amount of daily interaction a member has with other members 
and non-members, the ability of members to seek refuge from those who aren't members 
and at how early an age each group recruits). The second factor is whether or not a 
group's ideology is independent from its identity; a group with an ideology that is 
independent of its identity has more flexibility to modify its ideology without the fear of 
losing the sense of a common identity with the group of supporters that are committed to 
the group based on that feeling of identity. The third factor is how well the group 
symbolizes and frames its grievances in order to appeal to a larger group of people; a 
group that is effective at framing and symbolizing its grievances will mobilize a large 
following behind it even if most of those people don't truly believe in those grievances. 
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Membership in both the ETA and BR is highly inclusive of everyday life, 
requiring a great deal of commitment from their members. Due to the clandestine nature 
of the BR, members have no opportunity to lead lives in society in addition to the life as a 
member of the group; the individual is required to be a full time group member and to 
spend his or her days apart from society. Members in the ETA do not spend this much 
time on a daily basis with the group; members of the ETA have lives outside of the group 
and are allowed to conduct their lives as integrated members of society, spending time 
with families and being employed in a manner unrelated to the terrorist group. In this 
respect, the BR is more effectively mobilized. But the isolation caused by the 
underground nature of BR membership also hurts mobilization in some ways. ETA 
members have more interaction with society and are part of the villages and 
neighborhoods in the cities in which they live; this interaction enables them to gain 
support for the group from people not in the group. The BR, meanwhile, has a minimum 
of interaction with society and neighbors due to the strict clandestine nature of 
membership. 
Both groups recruited members from a very young age, the ETA using its ethnic 
identity to draw in youth and the BR using the student movement to appeal to younger 
members. In this test, however, the ETA is slightly more effective because its members 
were able to gain more support and refuge from neighbors and villagers than members of 
the Red Brigades were. This outside support was a significant advantage for the ETA, as 
it enabled the group to draw upon more resources and avoid government harassment 
more effectively. 
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The second gauge for judging mobilization effectiveness is the connection 
between identity and ideology. The ETA had an identity separate from its ideology. The 
ETA's identity was fixed; the common identity as a Basque was what the ETA used to 
create the bond of the group. The group's ideology was flexible, allowing for appeals to 
be made to a greater number of people. The flexible ideology could be altered without 
fear of accusations that the group had lost touch with those it had originally sought to 
protect. Whatever the ideology of the ETA, the group maintained its contact with those it 
sought to protect through its fixed identity of ethnicity. The Red Brigade, on the other 
hand, had an identity that was fixed to its ideology. The Red Brigade's original identity 
was the champion of the factory worker and the group's ideology was changing the 
capitalist labor system. Over the years, however, the BR's ideology changed to causing 
revolution in the heart of the state and the central government. Since the BR's identity 
was linked to its ideology, the change in ideology subsequently changed its identity and 
the factory workers and laborers felt isolated and abandoned. This was the cause of the 
accusations that the BR had lost touch with its constituents and supporters. Once the 
support of the laborers was lost, the Red Brigade was unsuccessful in mobilizing a group 
of supporters to replace the lost support of the laborers. In this test as well, the ETA was 
more effective in mobilizing its resources. 
The final test of mobilization is the groups' ability to frame and symbolize 
grievances and aims. The ETA was highly successful at framing its grievances and 
appealing to the greatest number of people possible. The ETA was able to convince a 
large number of people to support its cause by framing its goals in terms of the protection 
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of the endangered Basque language and culture. Framing the group's goals as the 
protection of an endangered language and culture gained the group more mobilization of 
support than if it had framed its goals in terms of a stronger Basque economy or greater 
voting rights for the Basques. Unlike the ETA's continued success at framing its 
grievances in this way, the BR was able to successfully symbolize its grievances and 
aims at first, but later failed to do this, and subsequently suffered in its .. ability to 
effectively mobilize. Originally, the Red Brigade was able to frame what it was fighting 
for in the context of a heroic war along the same romantic lines as the left wing partisans 
fighting the right wing fascists in World War Two. The BR framed its grievances in 
terms of wanting retribution for all the evil that had been done to the people of Italy, a 
sort of crusade for justice that was very successful at earning support and mobilizing 
people. In the later years of the BR's life, however, the group's actions became 
increasingly and needlessly violent and gruesome. Attacks that were previously carried 
out for symbolic value were abandoned and attacks carried out to cause death and 
carnage were substituted. Once this change occurred, the group began having an 
increasingly difficult time framing its aims and grievances in such a way that would be 
accepted. The group lost a lot of its effectiveness in mobilizing when it began its ultra-
violent campaign; its inability to justify and frame this violence hastened the group's loss 
of support and members as people began to want less and less to do with the BR. 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORTS 
The threat posed by terrorism is recognized as one that requires a great deal of 
attention and concerted effort. Not all countries have experienced the same degree of 
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internal terrorism as Spain with the ETA or Italy with the Red Brigades, but even a 
country with a minimal amount of terrorist activity within its borders needs to consider 
devoting efforts to combating this threat. Efforts at preventing an actual attack before it 
occurs are nearly impossible and attempting to demobilize a group before it engaged in 
terrorist violence would require the government to either guess at which groups would 
likely engage in violence or to demobilize all groups with grievances, both of which are 
unreasonable. Effectively combating terrorism requires preventing the group from 
sustaining its operations, which means preventing continued and effective mobilization. 
Efforts at countering terrorist mobilization efforts require not only diligence and patience, 
but also an accurate knowledge of the threat. Accurate knowledge of the terrorist group 
to be countered includes not only knowing how the group mobilizes people, but also how 
effective the group is at mobilization. 
By knowing how a terrorist group mobilizes, the government that is combating 
the group can focus its efforts. A government that is combating a group mobilized 
around class concerns, such as the promotion of factory laborer, will direct its energy 
against the factories and the workers, not against an ethnic or a religious group. These 
efforts can include diplomatic efforts such as negotiations and concessions, intelligence 
gathering, such as surveillance and infiltration, or even applications of force, such as 
raids and arrests. These efforts will be largely ineffective if a government directs them 
against, for example, a group of nationalists when in fact, the terrorist group is mobilized 
on a Marxist ideology. 
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Knowing how effective a terrorist group is at mobilization is also important for 
government efforts. If a government has reliable information that individuals in a group 
are not mobilized effectively, the government might be able to entice the members to quit 
the group in exchange for amnesty and a return to a normal lifestyle. Terrorist groups 
that are more effective at mobilization will require a significant amount of effort and 
resources to combat; the groups will be more resistant to government efforts. Members 
that are effectively mobilized will be less likely to have their loyalty to the group swayed 
by government efforts. 
Combating the threat posed by terrorist groups is difficult to accomplish. But by 
knowing how a terrorist group is mobilized and how effective it is at mobilization, efforts 
to combat the group can be focused and directed in a way that will be most effective at 
demobilizing the group and bringing about its demise. 
D. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
The evaluation and analysis of terrorist groups can take into account numerous 
factors and considerations in an attempt to reach a meaningful conclusion about terrorism 
or terrorist groups in particular. This thesis has attempted to evaluate which type of 
terrorist group is more effective at mobilizing its human resources: class based or 
ethnically based groups. Besides the comparison between the effectiveness in mobilizing 
resources, other comparisons can be made between class based and ethnicity based 
groups. For example, the operational decision making process for ethnic and class based 
groups could be analyzed to determine if there is a different pattern in the way the two 
groups operate. Further analysis might be able to determine if this difference was the 
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result of the class or ethnic base. If there is a noticeable difference in operational 
decision-making, predictions could be made ~bout the two groups future operations. 
Similarly, analysis could be done on the ability of both class based and ethnically based 
groups to withstand external efforts to weaken them, such as government efforts and 
effects of competing terrorist groups. Using this comparison, it could be determined if 
one type of group withstands direct government attempts to combat terrorism better than 
a different type of group. This would enable governments and authorities to predict 
which method might be most effective at combating terrorism. 
Terrorism is a threat that has been present for centuries; it is not the most deadly 
of threats but it is certainly amongst the most unpredictable and hardest to combat. 
Efforts at combating a terrorist group require a knowledge of the adversary as in depth 
and accurate as the knowledge of an adversary in more conventional forms of warfare. 
With a better understanding of how a terrorist group operates, why it operates the way it 
does and the history of its operations, success in combating that terrorist group becomes 
easier to attain. 
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